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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Kenner appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained as the result of the police’s warrantless search of the area between his underwear and
his naked buttocks, conducted following a traffic stop and while he was standing in a public
roadway. Mr. Kenner contends that the search exceeded the scope of a search incident to arrest
permitted by the Fourth Amendment, and that although he was on parole at the time, such search
exceeded the scope of the consent contained in his supervision agreement. Mr. Kenner claims
that, even if the police had justification for such a search, given the lack of exigency, the search
was nonetheless unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, in light of the manner and place in
which the search was conducted.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. Based on a statement
from a confidential informant (“CI”) that he could purchase methamphetamine from Mr. Kenner,
the police set up a controlled buy, using the CI and targeting Mr. Kenner. (Tr., p.22, Ls.2-8;
Tr., p.33, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Kenner was a parolee at the time, with an outstanding warrant for his
arrest on a parole violation. (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-7.) In setting up the controlled buy, the police
provided the CI with money to purchase methamphetamine and placed a radio transmitter on him
so they could monitor his conversation. (Tr., p.23, Ls.3-24; Tr., p.51, L.9.) However, none of
the eight to ten officers involved in the operation wore any type of recording devices.1 The

1

In an attempt to explain why no recordings were made in this case, the State’s witnesses told
the district court that the police practice was to not record controlled drug buys in order to
preserve the confidentiality of their informants: “Whenever we get into those situations where
you arrest certain people a lot of the time they give us information. You can’t have that stuff
released into court because that could get certain people hurt. That’s the main reason” (Tr., p.62,
1

police surveilled the CI from unmarked vehicles as he drove to an address in Heyburn, Idaho,
and they observed Mr. Kenner get into the CI’s car, drive to a park, and stop. (Tr., p.53, Ls.1415.)

However, when the police heard Mr. Kenner point out vehicles he thought looked

suspicious or were possibly law enforcement vehicles, they became concerned for the safety of
the CI and decided to conduct a traffic stop; one of the police vehicles activated its lights and
pulled over the vehicle in which Mr. Kenner was riding. (Tr., p.24, Ls.17-19; Tr., p.55, L.2.)
Approximately eight to ten officers, in multiple police vehicles, arrived at the scene. (Tr., p.63,
Ls.24-25; Tr., p.68, L.14.)
Several officers, including Detective Jordan Williams, along with Mr. Kenner’s parole
officer, Colin Widmier, removed Mr. Kenner from the passenger side of the vehicle and placed
him on the ground. (R., p.250; Tr., p.9, Ls.10-18.) Based on their knowledge of Mr. Kenner’s
prior arrest history, and because they were having difficulty controlling his hands, the officers
restrained Mr. Kenner’s hands behind his back for officer safety. (R., p.250; Tr., p.9, Ls.10-18.)
The officers also had observed Mr. Kenner attempting to reach the back of his pants, but they
were able to prevent Mr. Kenner from placing his hands in his pants. (Tr., p.65, L.6 – p.66, L.4.)
Officer Williams conducted a thorough pat down search of Mr. Kenner for any type of weapon,
large and small, including checking the area Mr. Kenner had been reaching for and around his
waist area, and found none. (Tr., p.66, L.22 – p.67, L.1.) Officer Williams testified he did not
believe Mr. Kenner had a weapon after that. (Tr., p.66, L.13 – p.67, L.1.)

Ls.4-12), and that the officers did not record their actions “for the safety of the CI (Tr., p.53,
Ls.1-2) However, in this case, the only individual whom the police did record was their
informant. (Tr., p.13, Ls.8-9.) That recording is not part of the appellate record in this case
because it was not played, nor its contents disclosed, at the suppression hearing (Tr., pp.5-73),
and it does not appear to have listened to or relied upon by the district court (see Order Denying
Motion to Suppress, R., pp.249-253), or filed with the district court in this matter (see Record of
Action, R., pp.2-12).
2

Meanwhile, the CI was interviewed by the detectives at the scene. (Tr., p.27, Ls.5-8;
p.44, Ls.1-8.) According to one of those detectives, Officer Matthew Love, the CI stated that he
believed Mr. Kenner had methamphetamine “in his buttocks.” (Tr., p.27, Ls.7-8; p.44, Ls.5-8.)
According to Officer Williams, who was attending Mr. Kenner at the time, one of the deputies at
the scene came over and informed the officer that the CI had told the detectives “where the
methamphetamine was.” (Tr., p.56, L.16 – p.57, L.9.) Mr. Kenner was brought to a standing
position next to a patrol car, and the parole officer asked Officer Williams to search Mr. Kenner.
(Tr., p.9, Ls.19-21.) The parole officer testified that his request for police assistance with the
search was made pursuant to the arrest on the IDOC warrant (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-8), and also
pursuant to search provisions of the parole agreement. (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-3; Exhibit A). The
probation officer also testified that when he asked Officer Williams to search Mr. Kenner, he did
not know about the CI’s statement about methamphetamine being in Mr. Kenner’s buttocks.
(Tr., p.18, Ls.5-8.)
After being requested to search Mr. Kenner, Officer Williams decided to search
Mr. Kenner’s buttocks area because “that’s where I was told the methamphetamine” was.
(Tr., p.57, Ls.2-9.) Officer Williams pulled back the waistband of Mr. Kenner’s pants and his
underwear, observed a plastic baggie “sticking out of” Mr. Kenner’s buttocks, and “just reached
in” and pulled the baggie out. (R., p.250; Tr., p.57, Ls.15-17.) Officer Williams testified that he
did not lower Mr. Kenner’s trousers or touch Mr. Kenner’s genitals or any other area of his body.
(Tr., p.57, L.15 – p.58, L.17.) Officer Williams also testified that, although the search took place
on a public city street, there was no way anyone could have observed the search of Mr. Kenner
given positioning of the officers and their multiple vehicles. (Tr., p.68, Ls.14-19.) Also, it was
dark outside. (Tr., p.17, L.7.)
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The baggie that was removed from Mr. Kenner contained substances later determined to
be methamphetamine and marijuana. (Tr., p.54, L.21 – p.60, L.12.) Based on that evidence, the
State charged Mr. Kenner with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and
possession of marijuana, and additionally filed a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.13, 26,
29.) Mr. Kenner filed a motion to suppress the evidence on the ground that the invasive nature
of the search violated his state and federal constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (R., p.41.)2
The district court denied the motion to suppress. The court analyzed the intrusion as a
type of “strip search” conducted incident to a lawful arrest. (R., p.252.) The court ruled there
was no question as to the validity of the arrest, no contention that the intrusion into Mr. Kenner’s
pants and underwear was anything other than a “search.” (R., p.251.) The district court then
framed the remaining issue as whether the search complied with the requirement of the Fourth
Amendment that searches be conducted in a reasonable manner. (R., p.251.) Noting that neither
the Idaho Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court has provided a test or clear
guidance for evaluating the reasonableness of strip searches conducted incident to arrest, the
district court applied the four-part weighing test used by the Supreme Court to determine the
reasonableness of a prison’s warrantless, suspicionless searches of inmates, Bell v. Wofish, 414
U.S. 520, 559 (1979), and the multi-factored test employed by the Ninth Circuit to evaluate the
reasonableness of blood draws in United States v. Fowlkes, 804 F.3d 594, 962-63 (9th Cir.
2015). (R., p.252.) Citing its findings that searching officer had not touched Mr. Kenner below

2

At one point, early in these proceedings, Mr. Kenner withdrew his motion to suppress and
entered a guilty plea (R., pp.57, 67); he then hired new counsel, was permitted to withdraw that
plea for just cause (R., p.195), and renewed his suppression motion, filing supplemental briefing
(R., p.203).
4

the waist, that the search lasted five to ten seconds and was conducted at nighttime and at the
side of the road with no third-party present, the district court concluded that the search was
constitutionally reasonable and denied the motion. (R., p.253.)
Following the denial of his suppression motion, Mr. Kenner pled guilty to an amended
charge of possession of methamphetamine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his
suppression motion. The district court sentenced Mr. Kenner to seven years, with a two-year
fixed term, to run concurrently with the sentence in the parole case and any other cases.
(Tr., p.104, Ls.17-21; R., p.304.) Mr. Kenner filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
(R., p.301.)
On appeal, Mr. Kenner contends he was subjected to a strip search, which exceeded the
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest, and that although he was on parole at the time,
such search also exceeded the scope of the search provisions in his supervision agreement.
Mr. Kenner alternatively claims that, even if the police had justification for such a search, the
search was nonetheless unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, in light of the manner and
place in which the search was conducted, and given the lack of exigency.

5

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kenner’s motion to suppress evidence?

6

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kenner’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court erred when it failed to suppress the evidence obtained from the search

inside of Mr. Kenner’s pants and underwear, conducted on a public street. The search was
conducted without a search warrant, and the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that
the search was conducted in compliance with a recognized exception to that warrant requirement.
The search, properly characterized within the umbrella term “strip search,” exceeded the scope
of a search incident to arrest, and likewise exceeded the scope of the consent-to-search
provisions in Mr. Kenner’s parole agreement. Although neither this Court nor the United States
Supreme Court has ruled upon the circumstances in which an arrestee may be strip searched,
Mr. Kenner urges this Court to recognize such searches may not, consistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement that searches be conducted in a reasonable manner, be conducted in a
public area with possible exposure to public view, unless there are exigent circumstances.
Given the lack of exigent circumstances justifying the immediate search inside of
Mr. Kenner’s underwear while he was standing in the public street, the State has failed to
demonstrate that Mr. Kenner’s warrantless search fell within any recognized exception to the
warrant requirement. The district court’s denial of his motion to suppress should be reversed.
B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a defendant’s motion to

suppress, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). Factual findings supported by substantial and
competent evidence are not clearly erroneous. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659 (2007).
7

“Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and
factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court.” Bishop, 146
Idaho at 804. However, this Court maintains free review over whether the facts surrounding the
search and seizure satisfy constitutional requirements. Henage, 143 Idaho at 658.
C.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Establishing The Warrantless Search Into
Mr. Kenner’s Pants And Underwear, Conducted On A Public Street, Was
Constitutionally Reasonable; The Evidence Obtained From That Search Should Have
Been Suppressed
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment functions to protect against searches
“which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208 (2009) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768
(1966)). Evidence obtained in violation of these constitutionally-guaranteed protections is
subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of both primary evidence
obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered and found
to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992). Here, the
police discovered the evidence during a warrantless search of Mr. Kenner’s person.
“Searches conducted without a warrant are considered per se unreasonable unless they
fall into one of the ‘specifically established and well-delineated exceptions’ to this general rule.”
State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647 (2017). Once a defendant has established that a warrantless
search occurred, the State bears the burden of establishing that a valid exception applies. State v.
Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 370 (Ct. App. 2015).

8

As demonstrated below, the search was constitutionally unreasonable. Although the
police had legal cause to arrest Mr. Kenner, the invasiveness of the search – intentionally pulling
his pants and underwear away from his body to obtain a view his naked buttocks, and then
reaching in to that area in search of possible drugs – exceeded the scope of permissible search
incident to arrest, and was not otherwise justified by the circumstances.

The search also

exceeded the scope of the search authorized by the consent provisions of Mr. Kenner’s parole
agreement, and exceeded the scope of the search requested by the parole officer. Even if the
police had justification to search Mr. Kenner, no exigency existed such that an invasive search,
conducted at the scene of the arrest, was reasonable.
1.

The Search Exceeded The Scope Of A Search Incident To Arrest

A search incident to a valid arrest is one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, and thus does not violate the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable
searches. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (overruled on other grounds);
State v. Moore, 129 Idaho 776, 781 (Ct. App. 1996). Pursuant to this exception, the police may
search an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 (1973); Moore, 129 Idaho at 781. Police are allowed to conduct a search incident to an
arrest in order “to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist
arrest or effect his escape ... [or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in
order to prevent its concealment or destruction.” Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. In Robinson, the
Supreme Court explained the scope of a search incident to an arrest in light of its decision in
Chimel, 414 U.S. at 218. The issue before the Court in Robinson was whether after a custodial
arrest, a police officer could conduct a full search of the arrestee or, whether if the scope of a
search incident to arrest is limited to a frisk of the outer clothing. The Court held that a search of
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an arrestee’s waist, pants, pockets, as well as the contents of the arrestee’s pockets, supports “the
need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody” as well as “the need to preserve the
evidence on his person for later use at trial” and is therefore permissible under Fourth
Amendment law. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234. The Court in Robinson held that, because the
exigencies giving rise to the search incident exception generally exist, that statistically-likely
exigency will serve, as an easily administered rule, to justify a search incident on an automatic
basis. Id. Thus, the Court opted for a bright-line rule rather than requiring an ad hoc showing of
exigency on a case-by-case basis. Id. Thus, once there is a custodial arrest, a “full search of the
person” requires no additional justification. Id.
The rationale of Chimel and Robinson entitles the police, under the Fourth Amendment,
to conduct a full search of the person incident to arrest, automatically, without particularized
suspicion or showing of exigency, but only so long and so far as the search does not involve a
bodily intrusion. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (observing that governmental
interests underlying a stationhouse search of an arrestee’s person differ from those following
immediate arrest, and cautioning that the Court was not now and had not previously considered
“the circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate”); see
also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits bodily intrusions that “are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an
improper manner”). Thus, while it is settled that a routine search incident to arrest does not
require a particularized suspicion, or a showing of exigency, there is room in the controlling
precedent for authority for holding that a strip search does, since neither the United States
Supreme Court nor the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically addressed the standards for
conducting, strip searches incident to an arrest. Mr. Kenner submits that strip searches, including
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the one conducted by the police in this case, exceed the scope of the search incident to arrest; not
only must they be justified by sufficient, particularized suspicion, they must be conducted in a
reasonable manner.

Regarding the latter, he urges this Court to adopt a bright-line rule

prohibiting police to conduct such searches in any public place, absent a showing of exigency.
See, e.g., Paulino v. State, 924 A.2d 308 (Md. 2007) (holding that, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, a “reach in” type of strip search was constitutionally unreasonable because it was
conducted in an open air carwash, rather than a more secluded place). And he asks this Court to
conclude that the strip search in this case was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
because it was conducted in public.
a.

The Search Inside Mr. Kenner’s Underwear Was A “Strip Search”
Requiring Additional Justification and Additional Safeguards For Privacy

For purposes of Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the search conducted inside Mr. Kenner’s
underwear should be characterized as a strip search, which includes “the exposure of a person’s
naked body for the purpose of a visual or physical examination.” Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d
356, 363 (4th Cir. 2001). See also State v. Harding, 9 A.3d 548, 560 (Md. 2010) (describing the
continuum of strip searches, with the so-called “reach in” to qualify as the least invasive of
them). A movement of clothing to facilitate the visual inspection of a suspect’s naked body, as
occurred in Mr. Kenner’s case, is a standard example of a strip search. See Edgerly v. City and
Cnty. of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 957-58 (9th Cir.2010); Kelsey v. Cnty, of Schoharie, 567
F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 2009); Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 561 n. 3 (1st Cir.1985). A suspect
need not have been fully undressed for the search to have characteristics of, or be treated as, a
strip search. See Amaechi, 237 F.3d at 363; United States v. Dorlouis, 107 F.3d 248, 256 (4th
Cir. 1997) (treating officer’s act of pulling down suspect’s trousers, without removing suspect’s
boxer shorts, as strip search); see also Wood v. Hancock Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 354 F.3d 57, 63
11

n. 10 (1st Cir. 2003) (recognizing that “a strip search may occur even when an inmate is not fully
disrobed”). Also instructive is the United States Supreme Court’s characterization of a strip
search in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009). There, the
Court held that a school official’s order that a student “remove her clothes down to her
underwear, and then ‘pull out’ her bra and the elastic band on her underpants .... in the presence
of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exposed breasts and pelvic area to some
degree,” constituted a search that could be fairly called a “strip search.” Id. at 374.
The manner and scope of the search at issue in Redding, like the search in the present
case, resulted in the pulling outward of the suspect’s underwear, and the exposure of the
suspect's private area. Although this case presents certain factual differences from the search at
issue in Redding, the similarities in the manner in which the searches were conducted supports a
conclusion that the police officers in the present case conducted a strip search of Mr. Kenner’s
person.
b.

The Strip Search Of Mr. Kenner In The Public Road Was Unreasonable
Given The Absence Of Exigent Circumstances

Mr. Kenner submits that, because the strip search exceeded the permissible scope of a
search incident to arrest, the State must demonstrate the necessity for such a search, which, he
contends, must turn upon the exigency of the circumstances and reasonableness. He notes that,
without the constitutional safeguards of exigent circumstances and reasonableness, every search
incident to arrest could result in a public strip search. The burden of establishing exigent
circumstances is on the State. State v. Wren, 115 Idaho 618, 768 (Ct. App. 1989); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
No exigent circumstances were established to justify the police officer’s immediate
search of Mr. Kenner while he was standing in a public street. There was no substantial reason
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to believe that the evidence would be destroyed if the search was delayed and Mr. Kenner was
removed to a private location. On the contrary, the police officer testified, explicitly, that even
though Mr. Kenner was attempting to reach the back of his pants, the officers were able to
prevent him from placing his hands in his pants. (Tr., p.65, L.6 – p.66, L.4.) Additionally, there
was ample law enforcement at the scene – eight to ten officers and multiple police vehicles – to
who could facilitate moving Mr. Kenner out of the public street without risking the destruction of
the evidence. The police’s decision to conduct a strip search in the public road was not supported
by any showing of exigency, and was unreasonable under the circumstances.
2.

The Search Was Not Authorized By Mr. Kenner’s Parole Status Or By The
Provisions Of His Parole Agreement

Mr. Kenner acknowledges the consent-to-search terms contained within his parole
agreement. (Exhibit A.) He contends, however, that a strip search on a public street was not
contemplated by those terms, and that he did not give his consent to such searches. This Court
has analyzed search provisions in probation and parole agreements as a “consent to search,” and
that when the basis for a search is consent, the search must conform to the limitations placed
upon the right granted by the consent. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208 (2009). The
standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective
reasonableness. State v. Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 731 (2002); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,
251 (1991).
The search also exceeded the scope of the parole officer’s request to search.

In

Armstrong, as a condition of his parole Mr. Armstrong had expressly agreed to submit to a
search by “any agent” of the Bureau of Parole and Probation. The parole officer’s request for
police assistance was made “pursuant to” that term. State v. Armstrong, 159 Idaho 364 (Ct. App.
2015) (holding that police-conducted search of parolee at request of parole officer was lawful,
13

where police “acted under the direction of the parole officer for the specific, limited purpose of
assisting with execution of a search authorized by the terms of [defendant’s] parole”).
Unlike the situation in Armstrong, the police officer in this case was not acting under the
direction of the parole officer and for the limited purpose of executing the search authorized by
the parole terms when he pulled back Mr. Kenner’s pants and underwear and reached in and
removed the baggie sticking out of Mr. Kenner’s buttocks.

As argued above, the parole

supervision agreement did not encompass a strip search, and Mr. Kenner’s parole officer testified
that he had no knowledge of the CI’s statement that drugs might be in Mr. Kenner’s buttocks,
and he did not ask the police officer to search inside of Mr. Kenner’s pants and underwear or his
buttocks area. (Tr., p.18, Ls.1-8.) The parole officer testified he never discussed strip searches
with Mr. Kenner at the time he signed the parole agreement, and that to his knowledge, the
Department of Probation and Parole had not policy regarding strip searches, and that he himself
had never conducted one. (Tr., p.14, Ls.11-16.)

CONCLUSION
Mr. Kenner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of his
suppression motion, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 3rd day of January, 2018.

___________/s/______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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